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Russian Energy Policy: Implications for Global Energy Security1 
Dina Moulioukova and Roger E. Kanet, University of Miami 
Russia currently cannot be considered an influential player in the global energy market, 
despite its significant exports and the heavy reliance of Europe on those exports. In the 
following pages we will argue that the domestic and international vulnerabilities of 
Russia in its energy sector make it rather a price taker and not an influential energy player 
on a global scale.2 We believe that Russia could successfully address these issues through 
the institutions of global energy governance. Russia’s preference, however, would be in 
the creation of a new energy regime, most likely under the umbrella of the BRICS, rather 
than participating in institutions constructed by the West.  
We will develop our overall argument in four parts. In the first we provide a brief 
overview of what we consider to be Russia’s core priorities and strategy and its vision of 
the future. We will further list domestic factors and limitations on Russia’s energy policy 
in the context of its overall strategy and its use of energy for political purposes. In the 
third part, we briefly outline international factors that in our opinion shape Russia’s 
behavior in its energy sector. Finally, we will pay particular attention to Russia’s support 
for the construction of a new regime of energy governance, namely through collaboration 
with the BRICS.  
Russia’s Strategy and Priorities 
The idea that an inherited “reputation for power” can constitute part of a state’s overall 
portfolio of power resources is not new. The international relations scholar A.F.K. 
Organski noted that states “that have been great powers in the past may continue to trade 
upon their reputation for some time.”3 International prestige is a key asset in 
complementing, reinforcing and underpinning such a reputation. International prestige by 
itself is socially constructed as it is “a function of other actor’s perceptions.”4 Such 
perceptions could be based, in part, on material factors. Some analysts argue, however, 
that the skill with which the state’s leaders position prestige in the key networks of 
international life is equally important.5  
In 2000, the Russian leadership set out its view of Russia’s problems and the 
priorities for tackling them in a public document called “Russia at the Turn of the 
Millennium.”6 This clearly became the basis for a political and economic strategy that 
arguably predetermines Russia’s behavior in the international arena. The basic claim for 
Great Power status was evident in this document that argued that “Russia was and will 
remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its 
geopolitical, economic and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of Russians 
and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do 
so now.”7 
The first of such priorities was, and continues to be, domestic consolidation. This 
view rests on the belief that domestic strength leads to greater international prestige, to 
respect and the willingness of other states to cooperate with Russia on an equal basis. For 
Russia, domestic power would be based on a “strong state” at home, which President 
Putin claims is compatible with healthy democracy: “For Russians a strong state is not an 
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anomaly to be discarded. Quite the contrary, they see it as the source and guarantee of 
order, and the initiator and the main driving force of change.”8   
Russia’s idea of “healthy democracy” is tied to the socially constructed notion of 
“sovereign democracy.” Martin Smith underlines three key and interrelated themes that 
underpin the idea.9 The first is the importance of strengthening Russia, both domestically 
and internationally, in order to reduce the risks to its security. The second, closely related 
to the first, is the focus on Russia’s sovereignty. The third is an affirmation that the 
Russian government would pursue its own course that is not to be dictated by others. 
Putin noted that the strength of Russia’s sovereignty would increase with its ability to 
determine its own course both domestically and internationally. Putin’s speech of 2005 
should be taken in the context of the deterioration of the Russian state and its prestige 
under his predecessor. While Russia was not viewed as fully sovereign in taking its 
international decisions during Yeltsin’s presidency, it was clearly asserting its 
independence under President Putin, who asserted: “It is precisely our values that 
determine our striving to enhance Russia’s independence as a state and to strengthen its 
sovereignty. We are a free nation, and our place in the modern world – I wish to stress 
this particularly -- will be determined only by how strong and successful we are.”10 The 
core message of Putin’s address was that Russia is acquiring “real” sovereignty, based on 
a new determination to pursue its own developmental path; this constituted the essence of 
sovereign democracy.11 It was designed, as Surkov put it, to give Russia back its status as 
a formidable power that is not independent on paper only.12 Russia’s concept of itself as a 
democratic state rests on the capability of prospering without undue reliance on other 
states. For Smith this entails limited engagement internationally, mainly to ensure that 
Russia’s core interests are not seriously threatened.  
Domestic Factors 
The Russian Federation ranks second in the world in the annual production of natural gas 
after the United States and is second only to Saudi Arabia in crude oil production.13 It is 
hard to underestimate, therefore, the importance of Russia's energy sector for the global 
energy supply. Clearly oil and gas are considered key to Russia’s return as an important 
player in the international arena. Some analysts believe that oil wealth will help it to 
regain its “superpower status.”14 It would seem, therefore, that abundance in Russia’s 
energy sector would strengthen its claim to sovereignty and self-reliance. The reality, 
however, is far more complex. 
First, energy could be considered as a major “value pump for its economy.” Based 
on the figures provided by the Russian Statistics Agency, energy has been accounting for 
over 70% of its overall exports. Gaddy and Ickes note that Russia’s political economy 
throughout its modern history has centered on the transfer of value from the resource 
sector to other parts of its economy. Resources continue to fuel Russia’s economy and 
polity, as they did in Soviet times. They argue further that the current state of the Russian 
economy is structurally inefficient and impossible to modernize.15 The economic 
structures bequeathed by central planning cannot compete in a market setting. The 
Russian fuel and energy sector serves as the generator and support of the Russian 
economy. In 2011 the non-oil sector current account deficit reached a record 13 percent 
of GDP, confirming the country’s dependence on Russia’s energy export sector.16 We 
could argue that the performance of the Russian energy sector is crucial to support an 
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otherwise unsustainable economy. Moreover, in addition to driving the Russian economy, 
this “value pump” finances the security net for millions of citizens who are employed by 
nonviable enterprises and depend on the state for heavily subsidized health and 
educational systems. 
Second, although Russia’s energy reserves have proven to be vast, so are the 
geological challenges that must be overcome to extract them.17 Most of the newly 
discovered fields lie deeper than earlier finds. Most of the recently discovered fields are 
offshore and in permafrost zones (Sakhalin deposits and the Shtokman gas field in the 
Barents Sea). All these factors influence substantially the extraction costs and the 
uncertainty about the profitability of such explorations. 
Third, we argue that the energy sector is one of the major contributing factors to 
Russia’s “resource curse.” The literature on the “resource curse” does not suggest that 
resource abundance is to blame for poor economic performance, conflict and 
authoritarianism. For example, the revenues from natural resources have contributed to 
economic development in Canada. Instead, it suggests that it is the lack of appropriate 
institutions and political structures that is to blame. It could be argued, however, that the 
presence of resource wealth often undermines the creation of the right state structures and 
makes the state susceptible to the dangers associated with the volatility of global energy 
and financial markets. Thus, Russia finds itself in a “Catch 22” situation, in which it 
needs to promote the diversification of its economy, while the only way that this could be 
accomplished is through the delivery of the rents from the energy sector.18 As noted by 
Pavel Baev, the central paradox of this strategy of overcoming the resource curse is that 
the necessary volume of revenue in the energy sector can only be generated by massive 
new investment in upstream production, so priority in revenue allocation effectively 
cannot be changed.19  
Joe Hellman puts responsibility for Russia’s uncompetitive resource-dominated 
economy on elite networks that eliminate competition and stall economic and political 
development in Russia. The Russian elites are characterized by rent-seeking behavior 
where “individuals seek returns from state-sanctioned monopoly rights.”20 As a result, 
rent-seeking and authoritarianism provide a “partial reform equilibrium” in Russia, 
according to Joel Hellman.21 A partial reform equilibrium takes place when short-term 
winners, instead of supporting reforms, stall the economy in an equilibrium that generates 
concentrated rents for themselves with high costs on the rest of the society.22 Despite the 
hope of its temporary nature, such equilibrium has proven to be internally coherent and 
stable in Russia – at least until the recent collapse of petroleum prices on the world 
market. 
On the level of corporate governance, state companies started playing a more 
prominent role in the economy after Mr. Putin’s rise to power. This was a departure from 
the Yeltsin period, when state companies were losing ground and were sold off to private 
owners. Especially in the energy sector, under Putin, the role of such companies as 
Gazprom and Rosneft rose and the boards of these companies were joined by people very 
close to the President’s circle. In 2004 the government took a decision to transfer a series 
of the largest Russian companies to the direct control of the government itself. These 
companies covered three major sectors of the economy,23 and the fuel and energy 
complex, along with electricity and atomic energy, was one of them. People from Putin’s 
team began systematically to join the board of directors of these companies. Some of 
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these officials have a visible public profile. For example, then chief of staff, Dmitry 
Medvedev, became chairman of the board of Gazprom and former Prime Minister Sergei 
Kirienko went to the Russian nuclear energy state company, Rosatom. In 2012 Deputy 
Prime Minister Igor Sechin left the government and was appointed to the board that 
oversees all of Russia’s state energy holdings. He then reclaimed the chairmanship of 
Rosneft, while remaining an advisor to President Putin. He also was appointed as a 
secretary of a presidential commission on energy, which supervises the energy industry in 
Russia.24  
Therefore, Russia’s economic system can be referred to as “state capitalism,” 
where the state dominates markets. Some claim that such dominance is primarily for 
political gain.25 Although business diplomacy does matter to Russia, it is usually through 
economic means that foreign objectives can be met by influencing other counties to align 
their policies with Russia. This has been argued to be the case in many instances with 
Russian energy policy.26 
However, the connection is reciprocal; the presence of Russian officials on the 
boards of major companies allows them to use their position for the advancement of 
business interests. However, the number one priority for any business is to profit and seek 
markets for its goods. This priority may conflict with foreign policy imperatives of the 
state. Since influence in Russia flows in both directions, from the state to business and 
vice versa, the question rises whose interests are being ultimately served. It is unclear 
whether the board members would be loyal to the Kremlin or the corporate interests they 
are charged with overseeing.27 It is a mistake, therefore, to argue that Russian state-
owned companies are driven purely by foreign policy imperatives.28 In effect, the very 
nature of state capitalism makes the governance of the energy sector less efficient and 
prone to corruption. 
Another relevant factor is Russia’s desire to modernize and diversify its economy 
away from its dependence on resource exports. The paradoxical situation, as noted by 
Michael Bradshaw, is the need for Russia to continue to invest in its fossil fuel energy 
economy to generate the income that the country needs to finance its programs to 
diminish Russia’s reliance on energy and the volatility of the energy markets. He further 
argues that the first half of the last decade may be seen now as a missed opportunity to 
apply energy revenues to modernize the country’s infrastructure and promote the 
diversification of its economy. Although Russia successfully withstood the storm of 
global financial crisis, the costs of Western sanctions because of the Ukraine crisis and 
the dramatic fall in the global price of oil have already begun to create serious economic 
problems for Russian efforts at modernization.  
In addition to domestic vulnerabilities caused by its energy sector, Russia is not 
really a dominant global supplier of energy, since is supplies less than 10 percent of 
global oil and gas. With such a low market share it is hard for Russia to achieve 
“superpower” status in leveraging the global market. Peter Rutland summarizes this point 
by noting that only through collusion with other producers could there be any risk of 
serious influence by Russia in cornering the global energy market. As a non-member of 
OPEC, Russia has not even attempted to coordinate its actions with the Organization and 
there has been little success in creating a natural gas version of OPEC. Rutland adds that 
overdependence on energy diminishes political stability and, in the absence of effective 
political institutions, usually means slower economic growth.29 
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The International Level and Global Governance 
The volatility of energy markets is one of the major concerns in today’s global 
economies. The geography of oil and gas production has shifted predominantly to non-
OECD countries and to states that give preferential treatment to their National Oil 
Companies over international oil companies. It is unfortunate that most of the current 
discussion of global energy security has centered on the security of supply, since for the 
producing states the security of demand and transit are equally important issues. In the 
case of Russia, there is a concern that Russia is overly reliant on exporting non-renewable 
resources. This puts Russia in a subordinate relationship with its customers and 
ultimately undermines its sovereignty. As was demonstrated during the long-term Russia-
Ukrainian gas conflict, any potential energy weapon is a “double-edged sword”. The “gas 
wars” of 2006 and 2009 showed that the relationships between energy producers and 
consumers are essentially symbiotic. Shutting off the supply of the gas to Ukraine was 
not only risky for Russia in economic terms, it also undermined Russia’s reputation as a 
reliable supplier and encouraged European states to look for alternative sources of 
supply.30 
The gas wars outlined several negative aspects of such dependency. First, from a 
revenue standpoint, Russia’s sales to Europe were reduced. Simon Pirani estimates these 
losses to have reached around $100 million per day.31 More importantly, as a result of the 
crisis, Russia irrevocably damaged its more than 40-year reputation as a reliable energy 
supplier in the eyes of its European partners. It is difficult to overestimate the importance 
of the reputational factor in this conflict, considering that energy revenues are vital for 
the Russian economy and that the European states represent its major customers. 
Moreover, we can argue that the negative impact of the dispute with Ukraine on Russia's 
reputation damaged both its immediate and its long-term business interests. First of all, it 
contributed to the intensification of the discourse inside the EU on the need for the 
diversification of its gas supplies with the goal of decreasing its dependence on Russia – 
for example, by building the planned Nabucco pipeline.32 As a result of such 
diversification, Russia could potentially experience a decrease of its share on European 
markets and face substantial losses in revenue. Secondly, the escalation of the conflict 
negatively affected the long-term strategic business interests of Gazprom in gaining 
access to additional customers.33 According to Feklyunina, Gazprom had had some 
success in obtaining access to gas distributional systems in Southern Europe and the 
Netherlands. However, after the “gas wars,” when it attempted to bid for the UK's largest 
distribution company, Centrica, it faced a wave of negative publicity that prevented it 
from successfully establishing its position in the UK.34 
The institutional dimension or lack of institutionalization -- the balancing of 
supply and demand35 -- is another important international factor that affects Russia’s 
energy security. There is a plethora of overlapping institutions and regimes that attempt 
to address the issue of energy market coordination. The G8+5 (Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, US) “+5” (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa), which 
was closely supported by the International Energy Agency (IEA) from 2005 to 2009, 
addressed some of the energy related issues at its various summits. The “+5”, however, 
has never been dealt with on the basis of equality with the G8 and, when the G20 was 
born, G8+5 ceased to exist. However, the G20 (which includes, in addition to G8+5, 
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Argentina, Australia, Indonesia, Korea, Saudi Arabia and the European Union) is a 
meeting place and not an agency. It requires strong supporting institutions to be the 
engine for effective energy cooperation.  
The most influential organizations in the oil sector are arguably the IEA and 
OPEC founded to counterbalance and offset each other’s influence. The IEA has the 
necessary institutional design and is considered by far the most substantial and influential 
body for international energy cooperation. It was established in 1970 by OECD states as 
predominantly a consumer body. The IEA is a treaty organization and the provisions of 
its treaty confine its membership to countries which are already members of the OECD. 
Almost all OECD members (28 in all) now belong to IEA. When the IEA was founded, 
these countries accounted for the great preponderance of international oil demand. Today, 
IEA members account for only about half of world oil demand and this ratio is declining 
steadily.36  
One of the weaknesses in the structure of global energy governance is the divide 
between developed and developing countries and the outdated format of the institutions 
involved in energy governance. As a result, some of the key players are excluded from 
consumer cooperation on energy security and supply. This is partly a question of formal 
mechanisms, but it also concerns the mutual understanding and trust that is needed to 
handle difficult situations.37 
Russia and Western Regimes 
It could be argued that Russia’s relations with the West emerged through two main 
stages. In the first Russia attempted to construct its image as a Western state by aligning 
itself with Western powers through aspirations to participate in the regimes constructed 
by the West. This period was short-lived, in large part because of the weakness of 
Yeltsin’s Russia and the Western perception of Russia as a liability rather than a 
strategically important partner. Such a perception resulted in the expansion of the West’s 
sphere of influence by directly encroaching on Russia’s neighborhood: for example, the 
expansion of NATO and the development of the EU’s soft power projects in Eurasia. The 
launching of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership that directly targeted 
former Soviet Republics (the sensitive areas of special interest for Russia), including the 
Association Agreement with Ukraine that sparked the current crisis in Ukraine, have been 
interpreted by Russia as direct threats to its interests.38  
With the growth of oil prices and, consequently, the revenues that Russia received 
from them Russia became a different player than it was during its “pro-Western” post-
Soviet period with its narrative for equality and respect. The watershed in Russian foreign 
policy39 came with Putin’s speech in Munich in 2007,40 which announced Russia as a 
major international actor that was no longer willing to follow the lead of the West. It also 
asserted Russia’s view of itself as a power pole in the international system. There soon 
followed the Foreign Policy Concept of 2008, which suggested the existence of an 
alternative to the West's value and development systems and competition between these 
different systems.41  
Did the West attempt to contain Russia’s development as a Great Power? The 
short answer is “yes”.42 Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it can be argued, 
the United States and the European Union pursued policies aimed at drawing former 
republics of the Soviet Union into closer union with the West, while also attempting to 
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limit Moscow’s reestablishing a dominant position in post-Soviet space. Apart from the 
soothing rhetoric employed by the West, repeated direct encroachment on Russia’s 
historic spheres of interests such as NATO’s eastward expansion, US funded NGO 
political activities in Russia, a US-NATO military outpost in Georgia and missile defense 
installations near Russia, would naturally antagonize the state whose leadership is bound 
by the narrative of “Great Power” and “Strong State”. As noted by Stephen Cohen, the 
“struggle for Ukraine is yet another chapter in the West’s ongoing US-led march toward 
post-Soviet Russia.”43  
According to the tenets of regime theory, dominant powers create regimes that 
serve their interests and reflect their understanding of normative values.44 Western states 
have set up a variety of regimes intended to solve major regional problems. Among them, 
the G7 (later G8) was envisioned as the headquarters for the deliberation and resolution 
of major economic and political issues. The idea behind the establishment of the group 
was that decisions taken by the G8 would trickle down and be implemented by individual 
states; political mechanisms on the domestic level, as well as international organizations, 
would help the process.45  
In its attempt to join Western institutions in the immediate post-Soviet years 
Russia invested considerable time and energy in the attempt to join the then “G7” that led 
to the establishment of “G8” or “G7 +Russia,” as it was referred to. By doing so Russia 
aspired to join the Western regime and follow its main foreign policy directives. 
However, Russia was invited to participate in the G7 on “Western terms,” as noted by 
Dmitri Trenin, with “door half open”.46 Talks that involved Russia in the context of the 
expanded G8 discussed predominantly non-economic issues, but did not include Russia 
in its discussions of financial decisions, thereby limiting the influence of Russia.47 
Russian analysts described this approach as the attempt by Western states to limit 
Russia’s influence within the group, while utilizing Russia’s external clout. This was 
done to champion the group’s influence throughout the rest of the world.  
On the economic and geopolitical levels the proposed Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the European Union 
presents a direct challenge to Russian interests. On the economic level the idea behind 
TTIP is to create a stronger economic bloc between the USA and the EU in the 
harmonization of safety requirements, regulations in financial markets, and the export of 
energy and raw materials from the US to the EU.48 In this scenario the Partnership will 
establish a free trade and investment area that would generate $164 billion per year for 
the European Union and $131 billion for the US, with a total increase in trade volumes of 
6% for the EU and 8% for the United States.49 The economic benefits for these two seem 
to be obvious. The question remains whether this increased integration creates 
disadvantages for the states left outside of the Partnership, especially for Russia. 
The most important issue for Russia in the TTIP relates to the energy sector, since 
energy exports comprise 75% of Russian sales to the EU50. If the TTIP eases access to 
the European market for the new gas generated by fracking from the United States, it will 
undoubtedly benefit both European consumers and American suppliers. At the same time, 
however, this new source of energy would substantially diminish the EU’s dependence 
on natural gas from Russia, which has been a stated objective of the EU ever since the 
Russian “gas wars” with Ukraine. This scenario would threaten Russia’s macroeconomic 
and geopolitical interests. With a decrease of European demand, Russia would have to 
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reorient its energy exports to other consumer markets, especially the ones in Asia.51 One 
can argue that TTIP could be an important catalyzer in the changes of global energy 
landscape. At the conclusion of TTIP, natural gas from the United States may 
significantly increase and that will have serious geopolitical implications on the relations 
of the European states with Russia. 
Some analysts underline the fact that the TTIP’s aspirations are not purely 
economic. The relative economic decline of the transatlantic axis is expected to speed up 
with the continuing rise of the emerging powers. Therefore, some see the true purpose of 
the TTIP as geopolitical. It aims to restore to the United States and the European Union 
the power to establish ground rules of the world economic order that other states would 
be forced to follow. It could be argued, therefore, that the TTIP is called upon to revive 
the West’s economic and intellectual leadership, with third countries being forced to 
adopt the rules imposed by the established powers. By implementing the Partnership the 
USA and the EU will become rule setters and regain the leading position in international 
trade and its development. The TTIP, therefore, could be seen as a part of the European 
and US reaction to their recent relative decline, as an instrument to regain leadership and 
greater influence in world affairs.52 This situation would be similar to that in the period 
preceding the rise of the emerging powers, when developing or less developed countries 
were not able to defend their interests against the advanced countries in the international 
economic organizations constructed by the West.53 At the same time the TTIP would lead 
to new protectionist standards against third countries such as China, India and Russia. 
This might trigger stronger cooperation among emerging economies in order to neutralize 
the negative consequences of the agreement. But, this would lead to further fragmentation 
of international trade and intensify the role of regional blocks.54 To conclude, the 
Kremlin’s calculations seem to favor building a cooperative bloc with emerging 
economies, in particular with China, even if that involves alienating the West. It is 
important for Russia to understand with clarity what unites it with China. Moreover such 
calculations should take into consideration what such ties will bring for Russia in the long 
run. 
The first argument in favor of closer ties with China is that they would provide a 
counterbalance in the international system to the unipolar domination of the United 
States. It would provide Russia and Putin’s regime with a needed ally to serve as the 
legitimation of the current “Great Power” strategy. With China by its side, Russia feels 
able to promote itself as a global great power as one of the leaders in a post-Western 
world order.55 
There is much that unites China and Russia normatively, even if they do not 
always share interests. For example, they share solidarity on issues such as sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, the need to counterbalance the USA, etc.56 Then there is the fact 
of China’s insatiable appetite for energy, despite its being one of the leading countries in 
the development of alternative green energy technologies. China represents one of the 
largest energy consumer markets that could potentially help to diversify the consumption 
of Russia’s energy exports.  However, a Russian decision to shift its economic relations 
away from the West and to expand its energy deliveries to China might not be as 
beneficial as expected. China’s development of alternative energy technologies, such as 
shale gas and fracking, would undeniably increase China’s leverage and negotiating 
strength. As a result, one might argue that Russia could lose more than it gained from 
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such a shift in its energy exports by placing it in a subordinate position with Beijing. 
Given the fact that China is already challenging Russia’s dominant role in Central Asia, 
such a strengthening of China’s position vis-à-vis Russia represents a new challenge. In 
particular, a growing imbalance of power could result in the eventual loss of de facto 
sovereignty over some parts of Siberia and Russia’s Far East. The Chinese could come to 
dominate Eurasia economically, exploiting its natural resources in a near-colonial 
relationship. On a more general level, Russia’s aspirations of center of power would be 
reduced to a subordinate player in China-dominated world.57  
 
Russia’s Role as a Leader in a Multipolar World 
One might argue that, due to the nature of Russia’s network regime58 and its discourse of 
“Great Power” that it has constructed, the projection of domestic strength vis-à-vis the 
external “other” is inevitable. It seems that at this point, the best course would be for 
Russia to consolidate power domestically in response to potential challenges from the 
West. Such action could be supported domestically by the rhetoric established by the 
recent events in Ukraine. 
 What might Russia’s calculations for the future be? Could we argue that the 
developments in Ukraine and Russia’s role in them have once again supported Russia’s 
priority in creating a new global order, rather than efforts to fit into regimes constructed 
by and dominated by the West? What awaits Russia if it chooses emerging economies as 
its primary allies?  Despite the very “diverse” characteristics of the states referred to by 
the acronym BRICS, there are unifying factors that can promote coherence in policy 
responses from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. There are two major 
benefits of constructing the BRICS as an international regime 
First, BRICS as an international regime would provide an opportunity to address 
pressing issues that members face and can resolve within the bloc, such as energy 
security. Second, building on the example of OPEC as an international regime that has 
historically unified different actors with often divergent agendas, BRICS could serve as a 
platform to amplify the bargaining power of its member states with regimes and states 
outside BRICS. In particular, they might further the creation of a multipolar world, along 
Russia’s preferred lines, and obtain concessions from the West and from the institutions it 
constructed for furthering its economic and geopolitical agenda. 
There seems to be a consensus among some scholars that BRICS countries “lack 
coherence”59 and “they do not share common political interests and are not a natural 
trading bloc,”60 and overall have little in common.61 Armijo asks whether the notion of 
BRICS is a “mirage” that “appears to be forced.”62 As Heine notes, the BRICS countries 
consist of democracies and non-democracies hailing from four different continents, of 
very different size and economic performance.63  Yet, Roberts and Armijo list ten 
commonalities that in their opinion unite the BRICS and can potentially support their 
acting as a viable bloc. 64 Among the unifying features, they list several factors: large 
populations that provide demographic dominance in their respective regions, the rate of 
economic growth that makes members the largest economies outside of the OECD with 
the exception of South Africa, and the absence of special relations between BRICS states 
and other major powers, especially military and political alliances, that could potentially 
hinder their affiliation with BRICS as an international regime. Importantly, Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa all have a long history of questioning or directly 
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contesting the supremacy of the West and share the conviction that the crucial step in 
their joint strategy should be the demand for more influence and decision-making power 
in international economic and financial institutions. Such influence would push towards a 
more multipolar international system that would consequently enhance BRICS’ role in 
world affairs. As Sadik Unay notes, in the emerging system of multipolarity, major 
players such as China and Russia have used their economic influence as a diplomatic tool 
to accelerate the transformation of global governance structures to a more balanced status 
in terms of the role of non-Western states. This perception transformed BRICS from an 
international investment strategy to a widely adopted symbol for the alleged decline of 
Western hegemony.65 The question arises of the possibility of BRICS evolving into an 
international regime that might challenge the existing regimes dominated by the West.  
Faced with criticism of the complexity of the definition of “regime,” Robert 
Keohane came up with a “lean” definition of the concept, as follows: “Regimes are 
institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments that pertain to particular sets 
of issues in international relations.”66 Therefore, two important points can be made: first, 
that international regimes are directly related to international institutions and should be 
studied as such; and second, that the terms “international regime” and “international 
organization” are not synonymous, even though in many cases regimes will be 
accompanied by organizations designed to support them. The major difference between 
them is that organizations can respond to events, whereas regimes are considered to be no 
more than sets of rules, norms and principles and do not possess the capacity to act. 
However, many of the functions prescribed to regimes could not be carried without some 
organizational structure that is embedded in them.67  
The Decline of Dominant Powers 
In international relations states can be classified according to whether they are 
superpowers, great powers, regional powers or middle powers. Such a classification is 
based primarily on a state’s military and economic capabilities, the geographic scope of 
its influence and the acknowledgement by other states of its power status. William Fox 
defined superpower as the great power that has a great mobility of power.68 According to 
Fox, superpowers deploy different instruments of power, such as military, political, 
economic and cultural to promote their interests and ideological preferences throughout 
the world.  
Unlike superpowers, great powers do not possess overwhelming dominance in all 
areas of power and may not have the capacity to bear the costs of regime maintenance. 
Like superpowers, great powers are global players that have the interest of projecting 
influence beyond their immediate region and have capacity and desire to exercise 
influence in global issues. Regional powers are considered to be middle powers: to be 
somewhere in the middle of great powers and other states. According to some analysts, 
based on this typology, the USA is the only state that could be considered as a 
superpower today. The European Union and Japan continue as global economic powers 
and have a substantial regional and global influence. China is considered as a rising great 
power, the second to the United States. Finally, Russia, India and Brazil – and to a lesser 
extent, South Africa -- dominate their regions and have aspirations to great power 
status.69  As a potential new regime, the BRICS comes in two major guises; on the one 
hand as a five-faced symbol of the growing weight of the emerging markets in the global 
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economy and, secondly, as a political institution created to redress the current balance in 
world affairs that favors the largest non-Western powers.70 
From the political point of view members of the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) they, as major regional powers, have historical legacies 
based on the contestation of Western hegemony in the international system through 
communist, socialist, or non-aligned discourses. As such, they could easily associate 
themselves with the dissatisfaction that has grown with the built-in inequalities that have 
been established in the modern West-centered regimes and exigencies of global 
capitalism exercised through multinational corporations.71 Yet, they have been seldom 
analyzed as a group because of their timid joint actions. Some analysts compare them to 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), since both are groups of emerging states that 
challenge the global pre-eminence of the West.72 The comparison is not fully accurate, 
however, since NAM was a large heterogeneous group, similar to the present emerging 
world of which the BRICS represents a vanguard.73 
Despite the differences among the members, this grouping of emerging 
economies is constructed on the basis of some common denominators. The first, as we 
have noted, is that BRICS countries are substantial in terms of their population and 
dominate their perspective regions in terms of demographic potential. Second, these 
countries constitute the largest economic bloc outside the industrialized countries in 
OECD with impressive economic growth figures and large domestic markets with 
considerable expansion capacity. Yet they are considered as developing countries 
because of their continuing developmental needs, informal economic sectors, etc. They 
generally adopt autonomous positions and distance themselves from Western-dominated 
politico-military frameworks, while also avoiding special security relations with Western 
powers exemplified by the relations between the United States and Japan for example.74 
The construction of BRICS, as well as the deterioration of Russia’s relations with 
the West, can be analyzed as a result of Russia’s experiences in dealing with the West. 
Initially Russia attempted to join the states at the core of the international system by 
attempting to construct socially its image as a Western state and by aligning itself with 
Western powers. As we noted earlier, this period was short-lived and, from Moscow’s 
perspective, was used by the West to expand its sphere of influence in Central and 
Eastern Europe through expanding membership and through the Eastern Partnership and 
the proposed Association Agreement with Ukraine. By 2005-07 the Russian leadership 
rejected further tutelage by the West and announced its intention to pursue its interests 
regardless of Western criticism.75 The power of five emerging economies in BRICS 
could be helpful for Russia in pushing against Western domination through the 
institutions of global economic governance that play such an important role in 
establishing a broad international agenda. During the BRICS summit on July 15th 2014 
the group of emerging economies signed a long-anticipated document to create a $100 
billion BRICS Development Bank and a reserve currency pool worth more than another 
$100 billion as an alternative to the existing US-dominated World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. The Bank has been set up to foster greater financial and 
development cooperation among the five emerging markets by countering the influence 
of Western-based lending institutions and the dollar. Documents on cooperation between 
BRICS export credit agencies and an agreement of cooperation in innovation were also 
signed.76 Writing in 2012, Putin stressed that the BRICS were a “striking symbol of the 
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transition from a unipolar world dominated by the United States to a more just world 
order.”77 
However, BRICS’ future as a geopolitical bloc is not certain.78 BRICS’ members 
share some important positions, such as the defense of sovereignty, non-interference in 
internal affairs and a common desire to rebalance power within international institutions 
in their favor, or, the creation of non-West-centered institutional regimes. But, there are 
some challenges and contradictions inside the bloc. India perceives China as one of its 
security challenges; Brazil, India and South Africa are democracies, while China and 
Russia are authoritarian states.  
Despite such inconsistencies within the BRICS group, Russia continues to use it 
as an instrument to advance its global agenda. Moreover, Russia has played the leading 
role in organizing the BRICS. Out of the five BRICS members, Russia is the only state 
with a recent history of global superpower status and wants to reassert itself as a global 
player. Analysts are divided on the importance of BRICS to Russia. Some believe that the 
importance of the BRICS does not extend beyond the issues of global economic 
governance.79 Others consider BRICS as the institutionalization and development of 
widespread awareness within global public opinion concerning the idea of a multipolar 
economic and political order. This could be considered one of Moscow’s most successful 
international initiatives in recent decades.80 
Conclusion 
The current standoff of Russia with the West over Ukraine provides more questions than 
answers about Russia’s visions as an international actor and about the future place of 
Russia in the global energy market. In this paper, we demonstrate the complexity of 
Russia as an international actor. We have tracked the deterioration of Russia’s relations 
with the West and its growing competition with both the EU and the United States and 
NATO for influence in post-Soviet Eurasia. We have noted the importance of Western 
control over major international economic regimes, as well as Russia’s willingness to use 
economic blackmail in its relations with post-Soviet states, even when that has led to 
Russia’s inability to meet its contractual obligations in supplying natural gas to EU 
member states. We have pointed, as well, to the concerns in Europe about the longer-term 
impact of the region’s heavy dependence on Russian energy and the inchoate plans to 
reduce that dependence. Finally, we have noted Russia’s major efforts to find alternative 
markets for its energy exports, especially in China, and the prospects of BRICS, 
stimulated by Russian leadership, to establish an international regime that may challenge 
some of the rules of the existing Western-dominated economic regimes. 
Russia’s role in the future supply of energy is not at all clear. This derives, first of 
all, from the complexity of Russian decision-making in the area of energy exports. It will 
be influenced, as well, by the glut in global energy markets resulting from both a 
slowdown in demand from countries such as China and the explosion of new energy 
sources in North America and elsewhere. What is clear is the fact that the Russian 
Federation is likely to find the importance of energy exports – as both an economic and a 
geopolitical tool – of reduced importance, at least in the foreseeable future. 
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